CWO no. 6, RTG user activities in aerospace nuclear safety and operations - An interim resource estimate by unknown
CWO NO. 6, I 
RTG USER ACTIVITIES 
IN AEROSPACE NUCLEAR SAFETY 
AND OPERATIONS- 
AN INTERIM RESOURCE 
ESTIMATE 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19710016304 2020-03-11T20:10:32+00:00Z
CWO NO. 6. 
RTG USER ACTIVITIES 
IN AEROSPACE NUCLEAR SAFETY 
AND OPERATIONS- 
AN INTERIhII RESOURCE 
ESTIDIATE 
May 7, 1 9 7 1  
Memorandum No. HA-3908-6-2 
P r e p a r e d  Under  
Cont rac t  No. 95281 2 
(Subcontract  Under NASA Con t r ac t  NAS7-100 
T a s k  O r d e r  No, RD-26) 
This work was prfomed for the Jet PropuPsisn Labornil-oq, 
California JrL ^ ~:"Fc of Tsch~snlogy, sponsored by the 
National hr:.ot~.rutics and Space A b ~ ~ a ~ o a s  w h
C~oatrnell: NAS7-1We 
HITTMAN ASSOCIATES, INC, 
COLUMBIA, MARY LAND 
TECHNICAL CONTENT STATEMENT 
I I This repor t  contains information prepared by Hittman Associates,  Tnc. 
under J P L  subcontract.  I ts  content is not necessar i ly  endorsed by the Jet  
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, o r  the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration. " 
iii 
LEGAL NOTICE 
This repor t  was prepared a s  an  account of Government sponsored 
work. Neither the United States, nor the California Institute of Technology- 
J e t  Propulsion Laboratory ( JPL) ,  nor any person acting on behalf of JPL: 
A. Makes any warranty  o r  representation, expressed o r  implied, 
with respect  to  the accuracy, completeness, o r  usefulness of the informa- 
tion contained in this report ,  o r  that the use of any information, apparatus,  
method o r  process  disclosed in this  repor t  may not infringe privately 
owned rights;  o r  
B. Assumes any liabili t ies with respect  to  the use of, o r  fo r  
damages resulting f r o m  the use of any information, apparatus,  method, 
o r  process  disclosed in this report .  
As used in the above, "person acting on  behalf of JPL" includes any 
employee o r  contractor  of J P L ,  o r  employee of such contractor,  t o  the 
extent that such employee o r  contractor of J P L ,  o r  employee of such con- 
t r ac to r  prepares ,  disseminates,  o r  provides access  to, any inforrna.tion 
pursuant to  his  employment o r  contract with J P L ,  o r  his  employment with 
such contractor.  
ABSTRACT 
This repor t  describes the work performed by Hittman Associates, Inc, 
under JPL Contract Work Order  No. 6. 
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I. SUMMARY 
This report describes the efforts which the Je t  Propulsion Laboratory 
(JPL), a s  the radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) user, w i l l  have 
to perform as  part  of an outer planets spacecraft program. The report is 
both an elaboration of the work a reas  covered for CWO No. 5 (Ref, 1) and a 
description of user  tasks not heretofore pi-esented. Taken together, this 
report  and the data in Reference 1 supply the general scope of a user r e -  
source estimate. Six major a r ea s  of work have been identified. These are: 
Safety Documentation Support Requirements 
43 Launch Approval Request 
d Design Support Activities 
o On-Lab and Launch Site Operations 
0 Emergency Procedures Manual 
619 User 's  Safety Analysis Report 
In each work a rea  a general description of user requirements has 
been presented. The descriptions a r e  one step removed from the point 
where manpower allocations can be assigned. This work order is the 
middle of a three-step process to ar r ive  a t  a complete resource estimate, 
In the last step (CWO No. 7 ) ,  it is intended that this report will be included 
and displayed a s  discrete tasks and subtasks. 
Each of the six a r ea s  of work has been broken down to identify those 
aspects of the task which relate to "nuclear safety" and those which reflect 
1 1  the category of "operations, In addition, the role of various J P L  groups 
has been described. These lat ter  include the Nuclear Power Sources G r o u p  
(NPSG), the Project Group (Project),  and the Nuclear Operations Working 
Group (NOWG) subcommittee. 
11. INTRODUCTION 
This report was prepared to satisfy the requirements of JPL Con.tract 
Work Order No. 6 (Ref. 2). The contract work order defines the effort for 
this task a s  follows: 
Elaborate upon the efforts and activities in the a r ea  
of Aerospace Nuclear Safety and Operations (ANS&O), a s  
they were identified in response to Contract Work Order 
(CWO) No. 5, that would typically be the responsibility of 
the user (connotes NASA/JPL) of the radioisotope thermo- 
electric generator (RTG). Features and characteristics of 
the outer-planets type of mission and hardware should be 
used for guidelines, constraints, and orientation. All sub-. 
sequent activities and the reporting thereof a r e  to be orga- 
nized to reflect the basic category classifications of "nuclear 
safety" and of "operations. r I 
The Hittman Associates response to CWO No. 5 is given by Reference I, 
111. SAFETY DOCUMENTATION SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS 
This section identifies and discusses the information and data, a s -  
sociated with the primary safety documentation, which J P L  is responsible 
for providing to the AEC and/or the AEC's RTG prime contractor. J P L ' s  
role in these activities will range from merely serving as  a catalyst in 
obtaining the data from others ,to actually generating the required informa- 
tion. Since the timing element is critical in a nuclear safety program, this 
section also develops a general span time and milestone schedule for these 
JPL activities, based on a late 1976 launch. 
Safety documentation requirements for space nuclear power systems 
have been defined by the AEC and have been followed for all  recent systems,  
It is assumed that the same general guidelines will apply to the outer planets' 
RTG application. 
The safety documentation is prepared by the RTG contractor in three 
volumes. Volume I is the Reference Design Document (RDD) and provides 
a definition and description of all systems, facilities, equipment, mission 
profiles and operating conditions, and all  basic data which will be used ~ L T  
the safety analyses. Volume I1 is the Accident Model Document (AMD). Its 
purpose is to identify al l  r ea l  and potential events which could lead to nuclear 
safety problems, along with a quantitative assessment of the event probabilitj es ,  
Volume 111 is the Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD) which provides 
an evaluation of system response to the defined events along with the resulting 
radiological consequences. The three volumes constitute the Safety Analysis 
Report (SAR). The SAR is  issued in three versions. The Prel iminary Safety 
Analysis Report (PSAR) is submitted within a few months after completion of 
the conceptual design phase. Its purpose is to describe the system and mis-  
sion and to identify potential problem areas  a s  early as  possible. An interim 
o r  updated version (ISAR) is issued a few months prior to delivery of the flight 
system. The date is variable, and this version is usually timed to include 
most of the key test  and analysis results.  It is used a s  the basis for initiating 
formal  flight approval reviews. The final SAR (FSAR) is issued at least six 
months prior to flight. It contains final details and data which were not 
available earl ier  and changes which have been made a s  a result of the reviews, 
In a sense, it is considered a historical document since it is issued after the 
flight approval proceedings a r e  virtually completed. The following sections 
identify and describe the data and information which J P L  will be required to  
provide for each volume of the safety documentation. 
A. Reference Design Document Inputs 
The major portion of JPL1s  safety documentation inputs will be re-  
quired for the Reference Design Document. 
A complete description of the spacecraft, its systems, and subsystems 
is required, a s  the spacecraft can influence both the exposure and response 
of the RTG to accident environments. Most of the required data will be ob- 
tained through the project. The information is required for the preliminary 
report but often the spacecraft design is not completed in-time for the PSAR. 
At a minimum, a semi-quantitative description is required for the PSAR. 
The final detailed design description must be available for the ISAR. Any 
late modifications a re  documented in the FSAR. It should be noted that any 
major changes which occur at any time in the program which could have a 
significant effect on the safety effort a re  transmitted immediately to the 
cognizant groups through established channels. Such major changes do not 
await the next issue of the SAR. This is true not only for the spacecraft 
data but for all JPL  inputs. The required spacecraft-related data include 
the following: 
(a) Overall design layout and description including component 
structures in both the launch and deployed configurations. 
(b) Operational characteristics which can be related to abort 
and RTG release. These include separation and deployment 
procedures, guidance, attitude controls, and auxiliary 
propulsion provisions and equipment. 
(c) Telemetry and other instrumentation, which may reflect 
RTG characteristics in an abort situation. Ground 
station locations a re  to be included. 
(d) Materials, weights, anddimensionsofthesubsystems 
including engineering properties of special or unusual 
materials such as  might be required for safety analyses. 
(e) Description of special equipment, devices, etc., such 
as  separation mechanisms, pressure vessels, pyro- 
technics, and others which could have a bearing on safety. 
(f)  Aerodynamic properties of the spacecraft in all possible 
deployed and undeployed configurations as  required for 
trajectory and reentry analyses. Depending on the com- 
plexity of the configuration and the availability of ex- 
perimental data for similar bodies, initial estimates 
might have to be supplemented by later wind tunnel tests. 
(g) Environmental parameters at the RTG location-vibration, 
temperature, pressure versus trajectory time. 
2. Launch Vehicle 
Most of the required launch vehicle information will be obtained directly 
from the manufacturers o r  through the NASA center which provides the 
vehicle to JPL. Unless the launch vehicle o r  one of its major components 
is new, much of the basic data should be available before the ISAR o r  per -  
haps even the FSAR. 
The required launch vehicle data includes the following: 
(a) Overall design layout and structure of each stage. 
Separation characteristics a r e  to be described so 
that abort configurations may be analyzed. 
(b) Dimensions, weights, and specific locations of major 
systems and subsystems. 
(c) Materials and materials  properties with special em- 
phasis on materials  and components of interest to 
safety. F o r  example, materials  which could burn, 
explode, o r  fo rm fragments in a pad abort should be 
characterized. 
(d) Propulsion system details including propellant quan- 
tit ies and properties, and grain configuration for solid 
propellants, 
(e)  Ignition, separation, guidance, and control system 
details should include special design features, mode 
of initiation and operation, redundancies, and other 
safety features, and some insight into possible failure 
modes. 
(f)  Flight weight chronology should include curves of weight 
versus trajectory time, weights at  specific staging points, 
and consumed weights during various operations. 
(g) Operational and performance characteristics including 
thrust  versus time, burning t imes of stages, payload 
capability data, etc. 
(h) Destruct capabilities including instrumentation for detect- 
ing vehicle status, transmission and readout of same, 
destruct system initiation and operating principles (com- 
mand and automatic), redundancies, safety features, 
destruct cri teria.  
(i) Tracking systems. 
( j )  Telemetry and other launch vehicle instrumentation, 
(k) Aerodynamic characteristics for all  vehicle configuratioris 
in various stages of flight. This should include aero-  
dynamic coefficients and likely reentry mode for the various 
stage combinations. 
3. Reference Trajectories 
It is unlikely that the final reference trajectories will be defined until 
late in the safety documentation sequence. Reasonable estimates will be 
required for the PSAR and a good approximation of the final trajectory i s  
required for the ISAR. Most of the information will be obtained from the 
project, with some coming from the launch vehicle manufacturers. (The 
latter may have to come through DOD. ) 
The required reference trajectory data includes the following: 
( a )  Staging event t imes and conditions - graphical and 
tabular form 
(b) Vehicle parameters versus time - including time 
histories of altitude, velocity, flight path angle, ac- 
celeration, attitude, range, and instantaneous impact 
point 
4. Launch Site and Range 
Some of the required data in this category will be readily available 
from ear l ier  programs. Data on new facilities which a r e  specific to the 
subject mission will be obtained largely from the project and from appro- 
priate NASA and DOD facilities groups at the launch site. 
The required launch site and range data include the follotving: 
(a) Complete description of a l l  JPLINASA facilities in which 
a fueled RTG will be housed for any reason while at the 
launch site. This should include location, facility layout, 
design, and construction features. 
(b) A listing and detailed description of all  JPLINASA-provided 
equipment to be used for handling, transporting, storing, or  
testing the RTG either on o r  off the spacecraft. This should 
include design details, planned and maximum ranges of operating 
conditions, and RTG equipment mounting details. Any special 
materials of potential interest to safety should be identified, 
Safety features of equipment should be described and launch 
pad cooling capabilities included. . 
(c) All JPL/ NASA-provided emergency equipment and services 
at the launch site and range should. be identified and described, 
This will include monitoring, decontamination, and recove rji. 
equipment. Numbers; locations, and capabilities should 
be stressed. 
(d) Responsibilities of JPL/NASA personnel in both normal 
and emergency operations. 
(e)  Tracking and data acquisition systems and equipment 
which a r e  under JPL~NASA cognizance should be identi- 
fied and described with respect to' function, operating 
capabilities and span time of operation. 
( f )  Special ground support equipment provided by JPLINASA 
which is not covered under any of the other categories 
should be descryoed, 
5. Range Safety 
In its role as  the user,  JPL will be responsible for coordinating the 
range safety data. The NPSG will work closely with project and range p e r -  
sonnel a s  well a s  with the AEC in developing this information. The PSAR 
will contain a description of the more-or-less standard methods and equip- 
ment used to detect flight malfunctions and terminate flight. It should also 
l is t  and discuss possible cr i ter ia  for destruct action. Since these cr i ter ia  
must be developed on the basis of safety analysis results,  it is unlikely that 
they can be quantified until the ISAR issue. The ISAR will contain a detailed 
and updated description of methods and equipment to be used for the speczfic 
mission. It will also present the Range Safety Officer's cr i ter ia  for de-  
s truct  action. The Jet  Propulsion Laboratory must take an active role in 
coordinating the requirements of various groups with respect to destruct 
cri teria.  In developing optimum destruct criteria,  safety, and mission 
objectives must be considered simultaneously. It might not be possible to 
finalize these cr i ter ia  until the final issue of the safety documentation. 
6. Reference Operational Procedures 
Inputs will be required with respect to what is to be done by JPLINASN 
at JPLINASA facilities during the entire prelaunch phase. This covers the 
period f rom heat source fueling through launch and consists of a general de- 
scription of procedure sequence and time spans. 
B. Accident Model Document Inputs 
- 
The Jet  Propulsion Laboratory will maintain a continuous coordination 
effort with the AEC and its contractor in connection with the AMD prepar a t' lon. 
. However, the specific inputs for which J P L  is responsible a r e  few and a r e  
a s  follows. 
1. Failure Mode Analysis 
The failure mode analysis o r  accident network development and evalua- 
tions form the basis of the AMD. The Jet  Propulsion Laboratory will be 
required to provide data concerning launch vehicle failure history, failure 
mode identification, and both experimental and calculated failure probabilities. 
As much of this data a s  possible should be provided for the PSAR but solrie 
of the data a r e  not likely to be available before the ISAR. Most of the r e -  
quired information will be obtained through the NASA center which provides 
the vehicle to JPL.  
2. Abort Trajectories 
Additional details on the spacecraft and launch vehicle will be required 
to ass is t  the AEC contractor in generating abort trajectories. These wi1.L in- 
clude physical characteristics,  aerodynamic properties and possibly materials 
properties. Breakup analyses involving the spacecraft and launch vehicle 
may be the responsibility of the user. These analyses will require a detailed 
aerothermodynamic evaluation of the many configurations which may reenter 
(all involving the RTG). Responsibility for breakup analyses will be defined 
in the program documentation (see Reference 1). 
C .  Nuclear Safety Analysis Document 
The Jet  Propulsion Laboratory will be responsible for providing the 
results  of any pertinent tes ts  on the spacecraft, launch vehicle, and ground 
support equipment. Most of these inputs will probably not be available prior  
to the ISAR. 
D. Milestone Schedule 
Figure 111-1 shows the typical schedule and rnajor milestones fo r  JPL 
safety documentation support activities based upon a 1976 launch. 

IV. LAUNCH APPROVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITIES - 
A detailed description of the launch approval procedure has  been p r e -  
sented in Reference 1. The exact sequence of events has  varied f r o m  pro-  
g r a m  to program, and the outer  planets mission, too, is likely to  have i t s  
unique aspects.  The extent of J P L  participation and the absolute schedule 
of events will depend upon the  safety problems encountered and the p rogress  
of the nuclear safety p rogram relat ive to  the total  program schedule, These 
cannot be predicted at  the present  t ime.  However, the discussions which 
follow re la te  to  a typical si tuation and will  suffice for  r e source  planning 
purposes,  
A. Related Documentation Requirements 
There  a r e  four major  documentation i tems associated with the launch 
approval procedure.  This  a s s u m e s  that a l l  nuclear  safety activit ies and 
documentation a r e  directed toward the ultimate objective of launch approval, 
The major  documentation i tem is the AEC Safety Analysis Report (SAR), 
with which J P L  will  have a significant involvement. This  has  been covered 
separa te ly  in Section 111 of th is  repor t .  Thus, any J P L  effort required in 
support of the SAR preparat ion and finalization will not be considered within 
the  scope of launch approval support activit ies,  
The second document of in te res t  is an  independent evaluation of opera-  
t ional safety by the Air F o r c e  Nuclear Power  System Safety Group (NPSSG), 
The evaluation is performed la rge ly  by a technical group a t  Kirtland Air 
F o r c e  Base but r ep resen t s  the coordinated position of the DOD, in general.  
The NPSSG assessmen t  is concerned with the safety of a l l  operations in-- 
volving the RTG a t  the launch s i t e  and in the downrange a r e a s  under the i r  
cognizance. Both personnel  and proper ty  safety a r e  of importance since 
the  launch will  involve Air F o r c e  personnel  and an Air F o r c e  facility, A 
portion of the data  and information requi red  by the NPSSG will  be obtained 
and details during the course  of the NPSSG evaluation. This  data  wi l l  in- 
volve sys t em design information, detai ls  on launch s i te  operations, a s  well  
a s  the liftoff and ascent  phases of the mission. J P L  might a lso be requested 
to  confer with the NPSSG and t o  review cer ta in  aspects  of the work pr ior  to 
publication. In general,  this  t a sk  will be essentially one of data  t r ansmis -  
s ion and no independent J P L  analyses  a r e  anticipated. 
The J e t  Propulsion Laboratory will  participate in the preparat ion of 
the NASA Staff P a p e r  which p resen t s  the official ~ A S A / u s e r  position r e -  
garding sys t em and miss ion  safety. Such papers  a r e  prepared by each of 
the four  participating agencies (NASA, AEC, DOD, DOS) af ter  a l l  analysis,  
t es t s ,  and other supporting information have been reviewed. (DOT will a lso 
participate in launch approval b2t with a res t r ic ted  role  since they a r e  con- 
cerned with t ranspor t  t o  the launch s i te .  ) The support will  involve technical. 
and management decisions regarding safety inadequacies,anresclved items, 
and overal l  recommendations concerning additional requirements  and ap- 
proval to launch. 
Following the preparation of Staff Papers ,  the Interagency Ad Eloc 
Safety Panel meets. The product of this Panel is the Safety Evaluation R e -  
port (SER). The SER, a s  described in Reference 2, is distinguished from 
the SAR in that it is an evaluation of overall  mission-related hazards an?. 
their consequences rather than an analysis of systems o r  operations, Much 
of the basic data required for the SER will be obtained from the SAR and 
other documents. However JPL,  a s  the user, will assist  the NASA. pane! 
member in this joint AECIDODINASA effort. This activity will involve 
manipulation and evaluation of data and possibly some limited additional 
analysis effort. 
Aside from the major documentation items delineated above, it vwill be 
necessary for JPL to prepare and issue numerous memoranda, letters,  and 
other minor documents throughout the launch approval span. This can be 
considered part of an overall  low-level support effort. 
B, Analysis Requirements 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory launch approval support activities, in 
the form of analysis, will be primarily related to safety documentation items, 
The extent of analysis can be a s  smal l  o r  a s  great as  J P L  program phi.losophy 
and funding dictate. At the present time, it is anticipated that a minimum of 
independent analyses will be performed. 
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory will conduct detailed reviews of each 
issue of the SAR. Some analytical effort should be planned in connection with 
these reviews, particularly the interim version. It might be necessary to  
check critical analyses in a reas  where potential problems a r e  indicated, It 
might further be desirable to conduct sensitivity analyses to evaluate the 
effects of certain parameter changes on the results.  
Some analysis effort should be planned in connection with preparation 
of the NASA Staff Paper. As noted earl ier ,  this will be a joint effort between 
NASA and JPL. Any analytical support will have to come from JPL,  
Action items generally result from the Interagency Ad Hoc Safety Panel 
Meetings. These will generally be in the form of requests for additional 
information. It is likely that some of these action items will be on JPL, 
They will entail data acquisition and possibly some analysis in a reas  per - 
taining to mission environments, spacecraft design details, and interfaces. 
Finally, J P L  might be required to perform some analyses in connection 
with the SER preparation, a s  noted ear l ier .  Additional minor analysis re -  
quirements might ar ise  from time to time, but generally this type of support 
will be associated with the major safety documentation items. 
C. Meetings, Interagency Interfaces, and Other JPL Action Items 
On the basis of past history, a rather large number of meetings can be  
anticipated in connection with the request for launch approval. Some of these 
will be major meetings involving all the cognizant and supporting groups, 
Others will be smaller  meetings of more  limited scope and will involve only 
some of the parties. As the user, it is important that JPL be represented 
at  most, if not all, of these meetings. The more significant meetings a n d  
interface e f f o ~ t s  a r e  identified below. In addition, there might be approxi- 
mately 1 0  l ess  formal meetings of committees o r  subgroups on a variety of 
related topics during the course of the proceedings. 
(1) Flanning Meeting - Early in the safety program, a pre-  
liminary meeting will be held with the Interagency Ad 
Hoc Safety Panel and other participants. The purpose is 
to discuss the system and mission concepts, as  well a s  
the planned safety program and approach, and to establish 
a milestone schedule for the launch approval proceedings. 
This generally is a very important meeting in that it de- 
velops the philosophy and ground rules for all  subsequent 
activit ie so 
( 2 )  PSAR Review Meeting - Following issuance of the PSAR, 
a l l  cognizant groups perform reviews to varying degrees. 
Written comments and questions a r e  submitted to the 
AEC within one to two months and then a meeting is held 
to discuss the reviews and the general progress of the 
safety program to that date. 
(3 )  Test  Plan Meeting - Key safety test  plans and procedures 
a r e  submitted to the launch approval participants a s  they 
a r e  developed. These a r e  reviewed for adequacy and 
then comments, questions, and recommendations a r e  sub - 
mitted. When all, o r  most, of the safety test plans and 
procedures have been issued and reviewed, a meeting is 
convened for the purpose of discussing and resolving the 
comments. The prime purpose of this meeting is to a s -  
sure  that all  Interagency Panel members and other 
cognizant groups a r e  in general agreement with the test  
program before it is run. Test procedures a r e  finalized 
on the basis of this meeting. 
(4) Test  and Analysis Review Meeting - Chronologically, this 
meeting occurs after the issuance of the ISAR and when 
the major portion of the system tes ts  and analyses have 
. been completed. The purpose is to present and discuss 
the results  and to identify any marginal o r  problem areas ,  
Requirements for further work a r e  established. At this 
point in time the final r i sk  analysis is generally not com- 
pleted and only preliminary estimates of potential popula- 
tion exposures and probabilities a r e  available. Nevertheless, 
the outcome of this meeting should provide a good indica- 
tion a s  to whether the approval will be relatively straight- 
forward o r  whether significant additional work is required 
to satisfy the Panel. 
(5) NPSSG Evaluation Meeting - A meeting will be held to 
review the results  of the NPSSG safety assessment. This 
is an important meeting because it provides a forum for  
resolution of differences between the AEC and NPSSG 
evaluations. It also provides a good indication a s  to 
whether the DOD will approve the launch from their facility 
without restrictions o r  will require additional safety 
verification. 
(6 )  Final Panel Meeting - At the completion of the safety pro- 
gram, the Interagency Ad Hoc Safety Panel and cognizant 
supporting groups convene for  a se r ies  of final review 
meetings. The overall  safety status and results a r e  r e -  
viewed in detail and conclusions a r e  formulated and sum- 
marized. The Panel  prepares the SER on the basis of 
this meeting. 
(7 )  NASC Meeting - One of the final steps in the launch approva! 
process is the convening of the National Aeronautics and 
Space Council to review the safety findings and make a r e -  
commendation to the President. 
As noted earl ier ,  in addition to these major meetings, there may be 
several  of a l ess  formal nature. Furthermore, J P L  should plan to provide 
a continuous low-level liaison effort throughout the launch approval proceedings, 
D. Milestone Schedule 
Figure IV-1 presents a schedule for J P L  launch approval support 
activities based on a 1976  launch. 

V. DESIGN SUPPORT ACTIVITIES 
A. Nuclear Safety Activities 
1. RTG Design 
The AEC has responsibilityfor designof the RTGfor anouter planets ap- 
plication. As the user, JPL must maintain an awareness of the RTG develop- 
ment effort and indeed will supply some of the parameters necessary for a 
satisfactory RTG design, The mechanisms governing user involvement in 
the RTG contractor work will be contained within the A E C ~ J P L  Interagency 
Agreement and the Technical Interface Requirements Document. 
The f irst  step in developing user support of RTG design is for the 
user, the AEC, and the RTG contractor to agree upon certain program 
ground rules. The ground rules will be contained in several  specificatiom 
a s  noted above. The content of these specifications has been discussed in 
CWO No. 5 (Ref. 2).  
Since the user will typically exercise a minimal role in develop- 
ment of the RTG power supply, RTG safety design support will become 
primarily a liaison type of task. 
a, Systems Liaison. The NPSG must be knowledgeable in all the 
systems aspects of the program. It is desirable that the following areas  of 
RTG development be monitored, even if on a low-level of effort: 
(1) Material selection and characterization 
( 2 )  Radioisotope fuel form development and studies 
(3)  Component design, manufacture, and quality control 
(4) Nominal RTG cper ating parameters and environments 
(5)  RTG qualification testing 
( 6 )  Nuclear radiation dose ra tes  and temporary 
shielding requirements 
(7 )  . Configuration control 
As pointed out in Reference 2, several  methods a r e  available to 
satisfy this monitoring function. For  a low-level of effort approach, a con- 
tinuing document review is appropriate. Interagency program agreements 
should clarify the documentation requirements. 
b. User Safety Studies, Independent studies pertaining to problems 
of safety will be required to supplement the results  of contractor studies, 
Unfortunately, the exact scope of these studies cannot be determined at Chis 
time since they a r e  a function of many unknowns. These unknowns include: 
( I )  What the AEC contractor funding level is 
(2) What problems a r e  encountered that relate to 
any of the RTG interfaces where the user has 
responsibility 
(3) What type of interagency agreement is worked 
out 
The total number of hours required for independent user SF-fely 
studies can be worked out on the basis of a number of premises o r  assurnpticlns 
and a general feel for how much user involvement is desired. Note that the  
safety studies referred to in this section a r e  to be differentiated from those 
already described in Section 111. In general, the studies here a r e  special 
requirements and should not fall  into the a r ea  of Launch Approval Support 
noted in Section IV. 
2. RTG /Spacecraft Interfaces 
a. Mechanical. As part  of nuclear safety design support, the JPL 
NPSG should monitor and support the design of the mechanical interface between 
the spacecraft and RTG power supply. The mechanical attachment of the 
RTG to the spacecraft will affect the reentry characteristics of the RTG, 
(Different attachments produce different RTG release times and hence a var ie t j  
of RTG reentry trajectories. ) Mechanical altachment characterisZies a r e  
also important inasmuch a s  they determine the transmissibility of vi'ora"lon 
loads from spacecraft to RTG. The vibration spectrum may be a key input 
fo r  assuring that the reentry protection of the RTG is demonstrated, 
b. Thermal. Thermal characterist ics of the interface must be  
defined for the RTG in the launch operational configurations, Thermal 
interface parameters may be required for reentry safety analyses, As 
part of the interface will be the responsibility of JPL, the JPL Project Croup 
and NPSG will have to begin by defining responsibilities in an interface 
document. A thermal interface requirement also exists between the IZTG 
and spa.cecraft a s  a result of on-pad cooling requirements. The RTG or  
RTG enclosure may require cooling to prevent heat shield oxidation. and/or 
to preclude damage to sensitive subsystems and components present in ilie 
vicinity of the interface. 
c. Nuclear Radiation. An interface requirement for nuclear radia- 
tion must be defined in t e rms  of an allowable personnel dose ra te  from the 
RTG. The ease of mechanical attachment of the RTG to the spacecraft ~ \ ~ , . i 4 i  
be examined in t e rms  of radiation limitations, 
3. Miss ion Planning 
An important nuclear safety interface with mission planning exists 
throughout the program. In general, the NPSG should advise the Project in 
several  key a r ea s  of mission planning. Each missicn of an outer planet 
s e r i e s  will have a somewhat different nuclear safety outlook. The following 
general area.s should be covered: 
(a)  Political Implications - To date no requirements have 
been formulated which relate to a release of substantial 
amounts of radioactive material  in ar, outer planet en- 
vironment. Some general response to this possibility 
should be prepared and available prior to the release 
of the SAR on the RTG. 
(b) Configuration Alternatives - Any change in spacecraft 
o r  launch vehicle configuration should be evaluated from 
a nuclear safety viewpoint, As an example, substitute 
upper stages may pose a different hazard from propellant 
explosion. 
(c)  Tracking Aids - Requirements for tracking and reentry 
aids should be established in the event of earth orbit. 
(d) Trajectory Planning - Trajectory alternatives should 
consider the hazards of an abort over land masses  along 
the trajectory path. 
4. User Testing 
The formulation of all  user  tes ts  involving the RTG should reflect con- a 
currence by nuclear safety personnel. An interface between safety and test  
operations can be achieved by safety approval of al l  procedural and specifica- 
tion documents involving RTG usage. This includes some of the on-lab 
operations and many of the prelaunch activities. 
As required documents a r e  generated by the outer planet Project 
Group, nuclear safety personnel will have to act irr an advisory capacity, 
reviewing all tests,  recommending and approving those approaches which 
pose the least nuclear safety hazard. There is an overlap between the 
activities described in this section and the operations evaluation coverecl in 
Section VI. 
5. Meeting. Attendance and Support 
Attendance of key meetings will help implement user design support 
activities in the nuclear safety area. Some meetings may require planning 
by the user. The vario.us types of RTG meetings which the user  may attend 
a r e  as follows: 
(a)  Planning 
(b) Status 
(c)  Formal  safety and system review 
(d) Formal  system acceptance 
(e)  Training 
( f )  Inspection and dry  runs 
Considerable time should be allocated for attending and supporting various 
meetings. For further discussion, see Fage VI-7 of Reference 1 and 
Page IV-3 of this report. 
B. Operations Activities 
1. User GSE Requirements 
The user GSE requirements will be dependent upon interagency agree- 
ments as  well a s  the funding level of the RTG contractor during the program 
duration. In general, it is expected that the RTG contractor will be  responsible 
for the design and fabrication of all GSE which will normally be necessary for 
a laboratory test environment, transportation, handling, o r  launch pad environ- 
ment. There may be exceptions to this generality, particularly for the launch 
pad requirements. 
At this point in time, a detailed description of GSE is not available, 
However, it can be assumed that at least the following safety-related items 
will be required: 
(a)  Shipping Containers - for t ransfer  and storage of the 
heat sources and the converters o r  RTGs. 
(b) RTG and/or Heat Source Handling Dolly - for moving 
the RTG within the laboratory o r  test area. 
(c)  Hoist Bar o r  Equivalent - an appropriate tool for ra i s -  
ing and mating the RTG to the spacecraft. 
(d) Test Console - an instrumentation and power supply 
console will be required for powering electrically 
heated generators and for monitoring parameters of 
a l l  RTGs under test. 
(e) Portable Monitoring Package - for measuring tempera- 
ture, pressure,  radioactivity, etc. when the heat 
source is in a shipping container. 
(f)  Portable Radiation Shielding 
(g) RTG Assembly Tools 
(h) Heat Source Cooling and/or Inert Gas Fill Equipment 
In addition to the above, a forklift truck and/or hoist will probably be neces- 
s a ry  to move the heat source in the shipping container, 
Fo r  on-lab operations, no activities a r e  contemplated which wouici 
require special precau.tions for radioactive fuel immobilization. Laboratory 
operations conforming to the general provisions of References 3 and 4 w i l l  
be adequate to handle the fueled RTGs. It  if is decided at a later  date to per -  
form balance tes ts  with the spacecraft and RTG, the requirement for building 
a protective enclosure around the RTGs should be evaluated. 
Items (a)  through (e)  of the GSE will, in all  likekihood, be provided by 
the AEC contractor. Clearly, the requirements for this GSE at  J P L  mcst 
b e  made clear  a t  the program outset. A user  training program will be required 
for familiarization and operation of al l  GSE, regardless of i ts  origin. Pa r t  of 
the training program will have to be safety oriented. 
The necessity for Item (f) of the GSE will depend upon several  factors 
including RTG radiation levels compared to allowables, length of time re-  
quired to perform assembly and/or tes t  operations, and the number of tech- 
nicians available. Item (f) may be provided by the user ,  particularly if  user 
radiological standards a r e  more  stringent than those of the AEC. 
The basic design requirements (Ref. 5) for  the MHW RTG indicate that 
the heat source may be shipped separately from the converter. If this ap-  
proach is used, assembly and disassembly of the RTG will have to be made 
both on-lab and at the launch site. To accomplish the assembly/disassembly 
a operation, special handling tools (GSE Item (g))  will be required. 'This GSE 
would be supplied by the AEC. An electrically heated generator is desirable 
for on-lab engineering development tests. These tests  a r e  peculiar to cievel- 
oping J P L  procedures and may require special handling and assembly tools, 
This GSE could be the financial responsibility of the user.  
In-air cooling requirements of the RTG will depend upon the final RTG 
design evolved for the outer planets application. Active cooling will require 
special GSE (Item (h)) which the AEC will supply. Similarly, if an inert gas 
approach is used to protect the converter and heat source, it is reasonable 
to expect that any supporting GSE will also be  supplied by the RTG contractor, 
In planning for  GSE support requirements, at  least  two a r ea s  should be 
carefully investigated to determine whether J P L  will have to design and pro- 
vide the GSE hardware. These are :  
(a) Special requirements dictated by using an electrically 
heated generator o r  some type of RTG model to develop 
procedures 
(b) GSE required only at the launch site. These would 
accommodate special operations and tes ts  required 
by J P L  at  the launch site only. Such equipment would 
not be used during any other phase of the program. 
2. GSE Interfaces 
The use of GSE for on-lab operations will involve J P L  personnel ( o r  
a J P L  spacecraft contractor), JPLJ procedures, and will be under the direction 
of a J P L  test coordinator. At the launch site,  the use of GSE will again b e  a 
J P L  o r  J P L  contractor responsibility under the direction of the spacecraft 
test  coordinator. AEC contractor personnel will act in an advisor;). cap~~ci ty .  
The user  has complete responsibility for  checkout and installation of the 
RTG and hence the accompanying GSE. The primary design interface which 
must be established is with the RTG contractor who will provide most s f  the 
GSE but will not use i t  at  the launch site. Design of the SGE must meet with 
JPL requirements and will necessitate a considerable liaison effort. 
Use of RTG Models 
In addition to development and fabrication of fueled RTGs, an RTG pro-  
g ram also includes requirements for electrically heated generator and gener- 
ator  models. In Section VI, the use of an electrically heated RTG, o r  a model 
simulating the RTG mass ,  is examined from a sequence standpoint. Depending 
on the type of procedures which JPL may desire to simulate prior  to receiving 
fueled RTGs, specific design requirements may exist for RTG models, As an 
example, if the electrical heaters  in the generator a r e  to operate for all  phases 
of handling, then the GSE electrical power interface will have to be designed 
to accommodate considerable movement of this hardware. 
Because TOPS will require multiple RTGs in a modular approach, models 
may be required to simulate mass  on the spacecraft. Such hardware would be 
a specific requirement for TOPS and their design and manufacture might be 
done completely by JPL groups. 
C. Milestone Schedule 
Figure V-1  shows a typical schedule and major milestones for JPL 
design support activities. The schedule is based upon a 1976 launch, 

VT. ON -LAB AND LAUNCH SITE OPERATIONS 
As use r  of the RTG, J P L  will have responsibil i ty for  activit ies in- 
volving the RTG during two periods of the spacecraf t  development. These 
activit ies a r e  divided h e r e  into "on-lab" and "prelaunch. " On-lab is defined 
a s  those activit ies which will  be c a r r e d  out at  JPL-Pasadena  during checkout 
and testing of the RTG. These will  be both sepa ra t e  f r o m  and in conjunction 
with the spacecraft .  Prelaunch activit ies occur  a t  the E a s t e r n  Tes t  Range 
(ETR) and a r e  concerned with s torage,  assembly, checkout, and testing of 
the RTG in conjunction with the spacecraf t .  Whereas J P L  will  have sole 
responsibility fo r  developing on-lab activit ies and procedures ,  the responsi-  
bility f o r  prelaunch operations will  be  shared  with the Air F o r c e  t e s t  wing, 
NASA-Lewis, and possibly the AEC o r  i t s  RTG contractor.  In the context 
used here,  J P L  includes not only J P L  personnel  but a lso any contractor  
which J P L  may choose to  develop and t e s t  the spacecraft .  
An evaluation of on-lab and prelaunch activit ies will  f o r m  the bas is  for  
a user-oriented Safety Analysis Report.  The repor t  (discussed in Section VIII) 
will  s e rve  the purposes of: 
8 Satisfying the requi rements  of the J P L  Nuclear Operations 
Working Group 
0 Providing the AEC with sufficient information so that the 
AEC will  permi t  the RTG to be s tored  and tested at  JPI, 
and launch s i te  operations 
In o rde r  to  rece ive  and t e s t  the RTG a t  a JPL facility, a nuclear  
safety capability must  be established. The capability involves specially 
t ra ined personnel, complete health physics coverage, facil i t ies which a s s u r e  
maximum radiological safety, and detailed t e s t  procedures .  The operational 
safety p rogram must  comply with the provisions contained in the AEC regula-  
tions (Refs. 3 and 4). 
At the present  t ime  no licensing for  J P L  is anticipated. The regulations 
contain provisions wherein the AEC may  exempt operation at  J P L  t e s t  faci l i t ies  
f r o m  special  nuclear ma te r i a l  licensing. With an exemption, the AEC / AL,O 
Operational Safety Division radiation safety requirements  will  be enforced. 
With the above approach, the AEC will  maintain control and ownership of the 
fueled RTG (o r  heat source  alone) at all t imes .  The Je t  Propulsion Laboratory 
will  have custody of the RTG during on-lab and most  launch s i te  operations. 2,yp- 
ically, AEC will  b e  responsible  fo r  transportation and will  b e  the custodian aurrng 
t ransi t .  It is probable that while the RTG is a t  ETR, the Air F o r c e  will be 
responsible f o r  on-site transportation. The details of custody and t ranspor ta-  
tion responsibil i ty should be contained in an interagency agreement  ( see  dis-  
cussions of " ~ n t e r f a c e  and P r o g r a m  Requirements" in Reference 2 ) .  In m y  
event, the use r  will  have t o  workout  the procedures  for  handling and using the 
RTG during a l l  phases  following acceptance f r o m  the RTG contractor ,  except 
t ranspor t  at  ion. 
A. On-Lab Sequence of Events 
The f irst  step in the JPL on-lab operations program will be to describe 
the various tests,  movements, hand.ling, storage, etc., fo r  the RTG. 
The purpose of the description is  to provide a basis for writing procedures 
which cover all phases of the on-lab operations. Generally, the description 
will cover the following: 
(1) Brief physical description and layout of facilities in- 
volved in the test  
( 2) Detailed chronological layout of all operations involving 
the RTG from receiving to eventual shipping 
( 3 )  Proximity and time information on personnel movements 
related to the RTG 
Preliminary sequences of events for on-lab operations a r e  shown in 
Figures VI-1 and VI-2. As early as  feasible, this sequence should be expanded 
into a more detailed form that can include manpower requirements, exposure 
t imes and/or expected radiation doses per step, support equipment require-  
ments, etc. 
The overall on-lab sequence of events has been divided into two p a r t s  
to cover engineering development of the fueled RTG operations sequence and 
the actual handling and testing of fueled RTGs. It is assumed in the sequences 
that the heat source may be shipped separately f rom the converter and power 
conditioning unit. (The t e r m  "converter" is loosely taken here in to include 
both converter and the power conditioning unit. ) Clearly, the requirement 
to assemble the RTG on-lab introduces a number of steps and requirements 
that can be eliminated only by having the RTG contractor ship the R T G  a s  
an assembly. 
The f irst  on-lab sequence is shown in Figure VI-1. At least one 
electrically powered heat source simulator is assumed to be utilized for  
this phase of the operations. Alternatively, an  inoperative RTG model 
could be used but would lack the temperature simulation which is important 
to developing an entire sequence of handling procedures. Certain portions 
of the spacecraft interface checkout will probably have to utilize models since 
the spacecraft will be powered by multiple RTG units. The RTG models will  
simulate mass, size, and attachment characteristics of the actual ETG.  An 
operational RTG model could permit the use of inert gas charging procedures aiid 
a realistic simulation of checkout by GSE. Insofar as  possible, the develop- 
ment test  steps should simulate the major steps of the fueled RTG sequence, 
In this way, it will be possible to predetermine test  setup tirnes, derive 
reliable exposure estimates, and check out many of the RTG/ spacecraft 
interface characteristics.  A complete evaluation of test  requirements using 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Steps 1 and 2 of Figure VI-1 require a carefully worked out procedure 
and an adequate knowledge of the shipping container construction, Healti1 
physics personnel should be in attendance during all phases of the simulated 
test ser ies .  
Figure VI-2 identifies the steps which pertain to on-lab operations with 
a fueled RTG. The heat source is received in its sealed shipping container, 
The shipping container is opened and a complete health physics check made 
to assure  that no radioactive contamination exists. Assuming the converter 
is received separately from the heat source, converter checkout procedures 
a r e  run prior  to assembling the ETG in an appropriate assembly area,  The 
heat source can be stored in the assembly area,  thus eliminating the need 
for  Step 5. In Step 6, the heat source is completely removed from its shipping 
container and subjected to a health physics survey. An alternative sequence 
has been noted on Figure VI-2 to cover the situation where the assembled 
RTG is received from the AEC contractor. At this time, it is not clear. what 
number of tes ts  will be run with the fueled RTG. Typical tes ts  and checks 
have been indicated in Step 1 2  for the RTG alone and in Steps 1 3  and 1 4  for 
the RTG and spacecraft. Proper  management of the tes t  se r ies  with the 
fueled RTG should be able to hold handling and movements to a minirnulm. 
A thorough and detailed preparation of the on-lab operation sequence in 
combination with a hazards evaluation will identify the optimum approach for 
rninimizng exposure time and enhancing overall nuclear safety. 
Step 1 6  of the fueled sequence pertains to the use of models for 
spacecraft tests.  It should be pointed out that a complete performance and 
characterization test  (Step 141, such a s  determining magnetic moments, may 
preclude the use of models. Instead, a complete complement of RTGs may 
be required. 
B. Launch Site Sequence of Events 
Figure VI-3 shows a projected sequence of events for launch site 
operations, Although this sequence will utilize flight hardware, there is 
no major difference through the f i rs t  nine steps from the on-lab sequence 
discussed previously. It should be noted that multiple RTGs may be involved 
a s  the power system for the outer planets spacecraft. Procedure development 
must anticipate any potential problems encountered in storing, moving, and 
handling multiple fueled units. 
Following spacecraft tes ts  in NASA/ JPL buildings at  ETR, the spaee- 
craft  must be moved to the launch pad a r ea  for assembly onto the launch 
vehicle. Step 1 2  may be made with the RTGs on the spacecraft o r  with RTGs 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































C. Operations Activities 
1. NPSG On- Lab Operations P r o c e d ~ ~ r e s  Requirements 
F r o m  the point of view of scope, the NPSG is concerned with all oper- 
ations involving the RTG, not just those which have some relationship to 
nuclear safety. The NPSG role is construed to be that of a support group 
performing the following general tasks: 
(a) Write specific sections of the on-lab RTG procedures which 
deal with nuclear safety. 
(b) Advise the Project  on the best way to perform a particular 
function which involves the RTG. This consulting service 
should be reflected in the writing of all  procedures. 
( c )  Review and critique all  procedures where the RTG is 
involved. These on-lab procedures should have an 
approval by the NPSG. 
(d) Coordinate health physics group participation in the various 
on-lab procedures. 
(e) Participate in o r  witness the actual performance of the 
on-lab operations with the RTG. 
At the present time, the depth to which J P L  will c a r ry  procedures is not 
known. A review of a few typical J P L  procedures should enable manpower 
requirements to be estimated with sufficient accuracy for planning purposes, 
The engineering development t es t s  suggested by Figure VI- 1 could be 
run without the use of formal  procedures, but this is not considered advisable, 
Probably the NPSG would have a substantial ro le  in performing the develop- 
ment tests.  
The following general a r ea s  of procedure inputs must be prepared and 
will be common io al l  major procedures involving the RTG: 
(a)  Removal of the heat source f rom its  shipping container, 
if applicable 
(b) Movement of the RTG on-lab in the shipping container 
(c) Movement of the RTG on-lab when the RTG is not in the 
. shipping container 
(d) Storage procedure 
(e) Lif t ingtheRTG 
(f )  Nuclear safety precautions, including dose ra te  1imitati.ons 
VI- 8 
(g) Cri teria for health physics personnel attendance 
(h) Emergency procedure applicability (see  Section VII) 
(i) Role of the AEC during all  procedures 
(j) GSE interface procedures, including checkout steps for 
the RTG components 
(k) An overall plan/procedure covering the approach to the 
on-lab engineering development tests,  the data desired, 
personnel required, and general procedure to be utilized 
The number of individual procedures which J P L  prepares will depend, 
of course, upon management policy and the number of tes ts  involved. A s  a 
preliminary planning estimate, the following procedures a r e  a'ssumed to be 
required: 
(a) Heat source receiving, inspection, and storage 
(b) Converter receiving, inspection, and storage 
(c) Converter checkout 
(d) A single procedure covering (a) ,  (b),  and (c) ,  if the 
RTG is shipped a s  a complete unit 
(e) Heat source (o r  RTG) handling and on-lab transportation 
(f)  RTG assembly and checkout 
( g )  Single procedure for each major test used to characterize 
RTG performance 
2. Project On-Lab Operations Procedures Requirements 
The J P L  spacecraft project group is assumed to be the responsible 
authority for generating a l l  spacecraft procedures. These include any tests  
on the spacecraft which involve the RTG. 
3. Launch Site Operations Procedures Requirements 
Procedural inputs covered in previous Section C. 1 and C. 2 also apply 
to the launch site. The number and type of tes ts  at  the launch site wi l l  center 
around the spacecraft. Scoping these tes ts  will require a rough knowledge 
of the spacecraft operations which involve the RTG. 
4. RTG Development Model Considerations 
Previous sections have identified the need for utilizing models of the 
RTG fo r  engineering development. Operations and procedures with either 
an electrically heated RTG o r  mass  simulating models will be part of the 
regular test  sequence. 
Fo r  the most part ,  i t  is expected that models used for engineering 
development ( see  Figure VI- 1, Section VI. A) will be discussed in one 
general plan. A detailed breakdown in the plan will be necessary to cover 
operations with an electrically powered heat source simulant and/or R.TC, 
Operations Hazard Evaluation 
The use of one o r  more  fueled RTGs on-lab and multiple fueled RTGs 
a t  the launch si te  clearly requires  a hazard evaluation. A good hazard 
evaluation is the crux of the justification for  utilizing the radioisotope fueled 
RTG on-lab. Additionally, the hazard evaluation serves  a practical purpose 
by identifying the operations which produce the greatest risk. Previous 
RTG hazard evaluation programs have concluded that on-lab and launch site 
operations present no significant problems when compared to the launch and 
ascent phases of the mission. This will probably be t rue  for  this program 
a s  well. F o r  this reason, a JPL hazards evaluation should be practical in 
approach and make full utilization of information gained through AEC con- 
tractor  liaison (see  Section V. A. 1). 
F o r  planning purposes, the bulk of the hazard evaluation will be con- 
sidered to fall  under this operations task. Other par ts  of the overall effort 
will deal with liaison and formal documentation. A nuclear safety Iiazards 
evaluation could typically be carr ied  out in the following steps: 
(1) Per form an analysis by constructing accident networks for 
the various operations involved during a particular phase 
of the RTG program, namely, on-lab o r  launch site. 
(2) Determine the failure mode and probability of occurrence and. 
response for each acciden.t o r  branch of the accident network 
( 3 )  Determine the probabilities associated with population 
density and fuel uptake in the accident surroundings 
(4) Evaluate plausible source t e r m s  for all  fuel re lease  
modes 
(5) Calculate fuel activity transport characteristics using 
the source t e rms  
(6) Determine interaction of activity with man via the usual 
routes of ingestion, inhalation, and direct exposure 
(7) Combine resul ts  into a hazard presentation 
Since the hazards surrounding on-lab operation a r e  undoubtedly small  and a 
fuel release will be virtual-ly impossible with proper RTG design, the on-lab 
hazards evaluation should not be too broad. It is suggested that the single 
most likely and severe accident be examined and a fuel release postulated a s  
might result  f rom severe f i re  o r  explosion. The effects of the release should 
be determined by examining the physical characteristics of the building and 
surroundings where the re lease  is assumed to take place. This will include 
the ventilation system, filters,  emergency protection, surrounding popu- 
lation characteristics,  etc. 
The results  of l e s s  severe accidents will not lead to a nuclear safety 
hazard but may be of interest f rom an operations viewpoint. Therefore, a 
complete hazards investigation can s ta r t  with the same basis  a s  used in the 
nuclear safety analysis (the accident models) but examine results  with the 
objective of providing revised handling and disposition information for 
damaged RTGs. 
A launch site hazard evaluation will be related to that of the on-lab 
investigation. The maximum credible accident chosen for evaluation wil l  be 
different than on-lab and might, for example, be postulated to result fro:% a 
test fixture malfunction while tes ts  a r e  being run in the ESF. The AEG RTG 
contractor will evaluate launch site operations in detail and this analysis 
should neither be  overlooked nor repeated. Again, the liaison task noted 
in Section V. A. 1 will be of value for this aspect of operations. 
E. Nuclear Operations Working Group Support Activities 
The Nuclear Operations Working Group (NOWG) is a subcommittee of 
the Safety Steering Committee instituted on each flight project a s  a JPL 
requirement. The NOWG is concerned with the integration aspects of using 
the RTGs a s  a subsystem of the spacecraft. 
The NOWG subcommittee will obtain i t s  inputs through normal project 
channels and will have access to project documentation. Support of this 
group's activities will require a block of time se t  aside by the NPSG to p re -  
pare  presentations, attend periodic meetings, and respond to action items 
a s  a result  of NOWG direction. 
F. Nilestone Schedule 
The major milestones and events in support of on-lab and launch site 
operations a r e  shown in Figure VI-4. 

VII. EMERGENCY PROCEDURES MANUAL 
An emergency procedures manual will find application when it becomes 
necessary to describe emergency procedures for accidents occurring during 
the J P L  on-lab activities and launch site activities. One manual will  su f -  
fice for both the on-lab and launch site activities. However, the detailed 
emergency procedures, such a s  the evacuationroute followed to a safe area,  
a r e  unique for a given custodial activity within the sequence of activities 
in the on-lab and launch site operations. A custodial activity is defined as 
being a specific handling, storage, o r  test  operation wherein the respon- 
sibility for the integrity of the RTG has been assigned to a group of individ- 
uals. The scope of the manual can be ascertained from the outline appearing 
in Section A on the next few pages and the succeeding discussion of the outline 
under Section B. 
To fully utilize the manual, it must become part of the formal program 
documentation system. It should be subject to formal approvd procedures 
and regular changes for updating and revision. 
A. Emergency Procedures Manual Outline 
1. General 
a .  Scope 
b. Description of RTG Activities and Sites 
(1) General description of system 
(2) J P L  on-lab areas  and activities 
(3) Launch site a reas  and activities 
c. Definition of Radiological Accidents 
(1) External radiation exposure 
(2) Internal radiation exposure 
e. Responsibilities 
2.  Radiation Exposure Guides for Radiation Workers 
a. External Exposures 
(1) Accidental high exposure 
(2) Emergency exposure 
b. Internal Exposures 
(1) Accidental high exposure 
(2) Emergency exposure 
(3) Short-term exposure 
C. Contamination Level Guides 
(1) Threshold levels in controlled a reas  
(2)  Exclusion a r ea s  
(3) Respiratory protection 
(4) Skin surfaces 
(5) Clothing and shoes 
(6) Item surfaces 
3. Pre-Planning for Emergency Procedures 
a. Time Divisions for Planning 
(1) Immediate emergency period 
(2) Post -emergency period 
b. Responsibilities 
c. Preparedness Check List 
d. Emergency Instrumentation and Equipment 
e. Practice Dril ls  
f. Special Precautions 
4. Immediate Emergency Procedures During Handling, Storage, 
and Test Operations 
a. Criteria for Determination of the Existence of an Accident 
b. Alarms 
c. Evacuation of Area and Immediate Actions 
d. Notification of Authorities 
e. Personnel Decontamination and F i r s t  Aid 
f. Emergency Area Surveys 
5. Post- Emergency Procedures 
a. Responsibility 
b. Contamination Control 
c. Recovery of Radioactive Material 
d. Decontamination of Area and Equipment 
e. Radioactive Waste Disposal 
f. Continuous Biomedical Examinations 
6. Records 
7. References and Applicable Documents 
B. Discussion of Content within Manual Sections 
1. General 
In Section 1 of the manual, the scope of the emergency procedures 
manual will be defined to encompass those emergenices occurring during 
the JPL on-lab activities and the launch site activities. A general de - 
scription of the outer planet spacecraft RTG system will be given. 
Performance and physical characteristics,  photographs, and the mission 
will be described to provide an overall  familiarity with the RTG system. 
The RTG-to- spacecraft interface must also be described. 
The JPL on-lab activities involving the RTG a r e  to be described 
completely. These may o r  may not be in conjunction with the spacecraft. 
Physical characterist ics of the a r ea s  in which these activities take place 
must be described in detail including layout and dimensions. The handling, 
storage, and testing activities include the initial receiving and inspection 
of the RTG and performance checks. The testing program for the RTG 
system includes vibration tests ,  thermal performance tests ,  radiation mea- 
surements, magnetic field measurements, dynamic balance testing, per- 
formance testing in vacuum, and other tes ts  defined in the on-lab sequ ence 
of events. 
The launch site activities involving the RTG system will be described 
completely. The physical characteristics of the launch site a r e  to include 
layout and dimensions. Initially after reception, the RTG system is inspected 
and preliminary performance checks a r e  made. The launch site sequence of 
events may include installation of the RTG into the spacecraft. Performance 
checks a r e  made throughout the integration of the RTG system with the space- 
craft and launch vehicle configura.tion. 
The accidents which a r e  considered to be radiological emergencies a r e  
to be defined. The worse case will be an accident resulting in escape of 
radioactive fuel from an RTG fuel capsule. However, an emergency need 
not require breach of the capsule. 
The potential hazards due to exposure of personnel to external o r  internal 
radiation must be defined following an accident. External radiation dose r a t e s  
a r e  determined in mremlh r  attributed to various non-nominal configurations 
of the RTG, e. g. , the bare  fuel capsule. Internal radiation exposure results  




(c) Absorption through wounds 
A procedure manual must define responsibility during the various activ- 
it ies contemplated for the RTG both on-lab and at  the launch site. Generally, 
the NPSG, in conjunction with health physics, will have responsibility for pre- 
emergency planning, emergency procedures, and post-emergency operations. 
Coordination and allocation of responsibilities between the project and the 
NPSG will be necessary a s  the project will be running the majority of all  of 
the tes ts  and operations where the manual is applicable. 
2. Radiation Exlsosure Guides for Radiation Workers 
In Section 2, the radiation exposure guides o r  thresholds for  radiation 
workers should be defined. Maximum permissible doses a r e  set  forth by the 
International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP). The accidental 
high exposure level and the emergency exposure level a r e  two classifications 
defined when describing both external and internal exposures. In additiori, 
a short- t e rm  exposure classification is included under internal exposures, 
Each classification of exposure is comprised of a dose magnitude and an 
exposure time period. 
In controlled areas ,  the threshold levels a r e  presented for airborne 
contamination. direct reading surface contamination and transferrable sur- 
face contamination due to alpha and beta-gamma radiation. An exclusior-i. a rea  
is defined a s  being one in which an accident has  taken place. This area  i s  
assumed to be contaminated to a level such that all  personnel have been 
evacuated and the a rea  has been sealed off. 
A guide for  respiratory protection from airborne contamination consists 
of the radiation levels and the corres2onding respi ra tory  equipmer~t recluired. 
Maximum permissible  contamination levels  based on direct surveys and t r ans -  
f e r a b l e ~  ( smears )  a r e  postulated for  skin surfaces,  clothing, and shozs, P e r -  
missible contamination guides must a lso  be defined for  the surfaces of m i s -  
cellaneous items, which must  be given a radiation o r  contamination clearance, 
i. e . ,  these i tems a r e  decontaminated until surface measurements  a r e  belon- 
the guide level. 
3 .  Pre-Planning f o r  Emergency Procedures  
The pre-planning for  emergency procedures is defined in Section 3 ,  Two 
t ime divisions o r  spans a r e  defined fo r  planning purposes: 
(a) The period of the emergency 
(b) The post-emergency period 
The plan of action for  the emergency requ i res  the clarification and integra- 
tion of specific responsibili t ies between management, the health physics 
group and the medical group. The responsibili t ies of each of these groiips 
must  be delineated and coordinated by the NPSG. 
Instrumentation and equipment required in the event of an accident must 
be defined. This  l ist  should include special portable survey instruments and 
laboratory counting equipment required to  detect radiation associated with 
accidents involving plutonium. The eqaipment also includes various apparel 
and breathing apparatus worn t o  reduce contamination to personnel. Special 
kits required f o r  the purpose of emergency monitoring only need to be deter- 
mined and optimally deployed. 
Provision should be made fo r  the periodic pract ice of the emergency 
plan through dril ls.  Personnel  and equipment a r e  thus in a state of readiness 
Special precautions need to be spelled out due to  peculiarit ies of the 
RTG system. Thermal  shock limitations of the sys tem res t r i c t  the 
t ime ra te  of change of tempera ture  due to  external perturbations to  an ailow- 
able magnitude. The system may requi re  storage in an  inert  atmospheric 
environment. Special precautions may a r i s e  a s  a resul t  of cooling system . 
requirements.  There  may be a severe  restr ict ion on the t ime of exposure 
of the system to  a i r .  
4. Immediate Emergency Procedures  During Handling, Storage, and 
Tes t  Operations 
The immediate emergency procedures to be followed must be spelled 
out in detail for  an accident taking pla-ce during the handling, storage, arid 
test  operations. Initially, c r i t e r i a  a r e  set forth defining the existence of an 
emergency. These  would include positive resul t s  froL-n: 
(a) Surface contamination checks 
(b) Airborne radioactivity measurements 
(c) Leaktestingofthefuelcapsule 
An alarm from a continuous a i r  monitor of particulate alpha activity js a n  
emergency. Emergencies also include: 
(a) Impact which may have damaged the RTG 
(b) F i r e  or'explosion involving the RTG 
(c) Natural disasters ,  such a s  earthquakes, involving the RTG 
Adequate alarm devices a r e  established in the facility to signal an 
emergency. Personnel r iust  then immediately follow specific evacuation 
routes to a designated safe assembly area.  While leaving with all  possible 
speed, one should alert  others in the a rea  who may not be aware of the 
emergency situation. The contaminated o r  exclusion a rea  must then be sealed 
off after all persons have been evacuated. 
Authorities to be notified must be specified. The J P L  on-lab and the 
launch site authorities would include the radiological safety officer, the group 
leader and director of the facility. Notification of local, state, and federal 
agencies might include health, f i re,  or  police departments. The AEC most 
be notified immediately. In some situations, radiological emergency ass is-  
tance is available from the AEC and the Department of Defense. Notification 
of the news media may also be necessary. 
Personnel involved in the accident must undergo decontamination and 
receive medical attention. 
Provisions should be made for  an initial survey to determine the extent 
and magnitude of airborne and surface contamination in those a r ea s  of speci;il 
interest outside of the exclusion area. Such a r ea s  would include the evacua- 
tion assembly area.  
5. Post-Emergency Procedures 
Post-emergency procedures will be defined for the time period following 
the emergency. Respective J P L  on-lab and launch site agencies would be 
responsible in most cases  for the necessary decontamination and recovery 
operations. Contamination control procedures a r e  formulated to prevent 
unnecessary exposures and dispersal of the contaminant. These controls 
include posting of signs, setting-up of control points for entry and exit, and 
issuing protective apparel to persons entering the exclusion area .  
The radioactive material  is recovered according to the specific instr~1.c- 
tions. Decontamination operations a r e  then carried out in order to resteoe 
the a rea  and equipment to normal. Radioactive wastes in the packaged fo rm 
and effluent form shall  be disposed of in accordance with applicable regtila- 
tions. Continuous biological and medical examinations involving injured 
persons  shall  be car r ied  out a s  deemed necessary  by the  medical  authorities, 
6. Records 
The importance of an  accurate  log and complete r ecords  during and 
following an emergency incident cannot be emphasized enough. Records 
for  the post-emergency period shall  be a s  specified in the  Code of Federal 
Regulations. 
7. References and Applicable Documents 
The  references  supplied in the Emergency Procedures  Manual shall 
include those addressed to the various regulations and international recom- 
mendations for  radiological hazards.  
Applicable documents may include. the program specification, an  inter-  
agency agreement,  and an appropriate technical interface specification. 
C. Milestone Schedule 
The ma jo r  milestones and schedule for  preparing the Emergency P r o -  
cedures  Manual a r e  shown in Figure VII-1. 

VIII. USER'S SAFETY R1'3ALYSIS REPORT 
This section defines and discusses the effort and documentation necessary 
to establish and justify JPL 's  qualifications for acquisition and use of RTGs, 
both on-lab and at the launch site. The major product of this effort will be 
an SAR type of report which will demonstrate the safety of planned operations 
a s  well a s  identify and quantify the nature and magnitude of any associated 
risks. The user SAR will serve several purposes. F i r s t ,  it will satisfy the 
AEC1s minimum health and safety requirements for activities involving special 
nuclear material. Second, it will satisfy JPL 's  internal health and safety re -  
quirements. Finally, it will provide the necessary backup and justification 
for conformance with the health and safety requirements of the Air Force and 
other cognizant groups at the launch site. While the report will be adequate a s  
a vehicle for licensing of JPL facilities for special nuclear material, no need 
for licensing i s  anticipated. 
The document and the type of effort required for i ts  preparation a re  best 
described by f i rs t  presenting an overall outline and then providing brief descrip- 
tions of each of the outline elements. This is the approach taken in the two 
subsections herein. It should be noted that while the scope of this document 
is broad, large portions of the required information and analysis can be ref- 
erenced to the AEC Safety Analysis Report, the NPSSG evaluation, and other 
pertinent safety documentation. Thus, JPL  can prepare a comprehensive 
and multipurpose safety document without expending excessively large man- 
power resources. 
A. User 's  Safety Analysis Report Outline 
1. Introduction 
2. Summary 
3. System Descriptions 
4. On- Lab Facility Description 
a. Physical Facilities 
b. Site 
c. Normal and Emergency Equipment 
5. Launch Site Facility Description 
a. Physical Facil i t ies 
b. Site 
c. Normal  and Emergency Equipment 
6. On-Lab Operat ions Analysis 
a. Description of Operations 
b. Accident Networks 
c. Fa i lu re  Mode Analysis 
d. Source T e r m  Definition 
e. On-Lab Activity Release Summary 
7. Consequences of On-Lab Accidents 
a. Personnel  Exposures  
b. P rope r ty  Exposure 
8. On-Lab Responsibil i t ies 
a. Responsibility Assignments  
b. Emergency P l a n s  
c. Personnel  Qualifications 
9. Launch Site Operations Analysis 
a. Description of Operations 
b. Accident Networks 
c. Fa i lu re  Mode Analysis 
d. Source T e r m  Definition 
e. Launch Site Activity Release Summary 
10. Consequences of Launch Site Accidents 
a. Personnel  Exposures  
b. P rope r ty  Exposure 
11. Launch Site Responsibilities 
a.  Responsibility Assignments 
b. EmergencyPlans  
c. Personnel  Qualifications 
12 .  References 
13.  Appendices 
B. User ' s  Safety Analysis Report Description 
1. Introduction 
This  section descr ibes  the purpose,philosophy, and scope of the report  
It should include a brief resume of the report  contents. 
2. Summarv 
The findings of the safety analysis  a r e  summarized in a s  concise a 
manner a s  possible. Par t icular  emphasis  should be given to  conclusions 
regarding the safety of the operations and the consequences of accidents. 
Tables a r e  useful in summarizing th is  type of information. The summary 
should be sufficiently comprehensive s o  that the reader  can obtain from it a 
good overview of the r i s k s  attendant t o  the planned operations and need not 
read  the ent ire  report  unless further  details a r e  required. 
3. System Descriptions 
This  includes a description of the RTG, the spacecraft ,  and any ancillary 
o r  groond support equipment which will be involved in the on-lab and launch 
s i te  activities. The radioisotope fuel and i t s  encapsulation should be described 
in some detail a s  should any other components o r  subsystems which could 
influence safety. Other portions of the system and equipment need only be 
described in general t e rms .  
4. On-Lab Facility Description 
a. Physical Facili t ies.  Descriptions should be provided for  all build- 
ings and a r e a s  where foeled RTGs o r  heat sources  will be stored, tested, o r  
transported. These  will include: layouts, construction features,  test  and 
handling equipment, a i r  circulation system details, access  to  a reas ,  identi- 
fication of nearby explosive o r  inflammable mater ia ls .  
b. Site. Description of the site surrounding the J P L  facility should 
be limited to those features and characteristics which can affect the occurrence 
of an accident o r  i t s  consequences. It should include the following. 
(1) Population Distribution. Population density and location 
of centers (day and night) both on-lab and a s  a function of distance 
around the facility. 
(2) Land Use. Categorization of land use in a r ea s  surrounding 
the JPL facility with respect to residential, farming, grazing, industrial, 
commercial, etc. 
(3 )  Meteorology. Routine meteorological characteristics,  such 
as wind ro se  and stability data. 
(4) Seismology. History of seismic activity in the area. 
(5) Topography. Topographic characteristics which could 
influence deposition and transport of released radioactive ma.terial, 
(6) Geology and Hydrology. Characteristics which could influence 
activity absorption and transport, including surface and groundwaters, 
The depth of coverage in the above a r ea s  should be minimal. 
c. Normal and Emergency Equipment. This includes identifiezition 
and description of all  health physics and emergency equipment. The number 
and types of radiation monit6ring equipment whichwill be used for normal 
health physics surveillance and to detect a re lease  will be described, together 
with their capabilities. The same type of information will be provided for 
emergency equipment such a s  alarms,  f i re  fighting apparatus, retr ieval  
devices, temporary storage containers, etc. 
Launch Site Facility Description 
a. Physical Facilities. The type of information contained in this section 
is similar  to that provided for the on-lab facility description. A complete de- 
scription of the launch pad and i t s  associated equipment should be included. 
b. Site. The same categories of characteristics which were dis- 
cussed for  the JPL site will be provided in this section. 
c. Normal and Emergency, Equipment. This section too will parallel 
that for  the J P L  facility. As is also the case for  the physical facilities and 
site,  the information required for this section can be taken directly frorn "ce 
AEC1s SAR with minimal modifications and additions. 
6. On- Lab O ~ e r a t i o n s  Analvsis 
a. Description of Operations. A complete description of all  events 
and operations will be provided covering the time from arr ival  of a fueled unit 
on-lab until i t s  removal. These operations have been discussed generally in 
Section VI of this C'CVO No. 6 report, The description should include a s e -  
quence and schedule of events and the range of conditions for all tests.  
Where on-site transport o r  handling is required, the modes should be de- 
scribed. Special safety and handling precautions should be identified and 
discussed, a s  should the health physics operations. 
b. Accident Networks. Detailed accident networks will be developed 
from the description of operations discussed above. The networks will be in 
the fault tree-type of format which has been used in most SARs to date. The 
entire sequence of operations can be presented in one o r  more networks, a s  
appropriate. It is important that the operations be analyzed thoroughly to  
identify every credible mishap, the resulting environment and its consequences 
to the system. 
c. Failure Mode Analysis. Analyses will be made, based upon the 
defined mishaps and environments, to determine which network sequences of 
events can terminate in activity releases.  Wherever possible, system r e  - 
sponses should be determined by analogy with similar  analyses and situations 
in the AEC Is SAR document. In those situations where potential failures a re  
identified, the mode of failure will be defined. Fo r  example, is the failure 
in the form of containment melting, erosion due to chemical reaction, a small  
crack due to impact o r  s t ress ,  o r  a massive and violent rupture? The prob- 
ability of each type of identified failure should be estimated with the maximum 
accuracy possible by determining the independent and conditional probabilities 
of the components in the sequence of events. This will require some knowledge 
of equipment failure probabilities and modes, resulting environment m-agnitu.de s 
and probabilities, and system response to the environments. 
d. Source T e r m  Definition. A source t e r m  will be defined for each 
activity release identified in the failure mode analysis. A source term. is 
defined by the quantity of activity released, the ra te  of release,and the physical/ 
chemical state of the activity. Fo r  example, this will include the total quantity 
of release in curies, the time over which the release occurs if it is not in- 
stantaneous, and whether the activity is in the form of a vapor, small  particu- 
late, large solid form, etc. If any chemical reactions have occurred to modify 
the as-produced chemical form, these must be considered. In some cases, 
more  than one source t e r m  might be credible from a given se r ies  of events, 
It will then be necessary to assign relative probabilities to each of the possible 
source terms.  Here, too, much of the source t e r m  definition can be accomplished 
by comparison with analyses in the AEC1s SAR. 
e. On-Lab Activity Release Summary. This is a brief summarization. 
of the results  of the on-lab operations analysis. Its purpose is to tie together 
the identified re lease  causes; failure modes, source-terms and probabilities. 
As appropriate, the summary will identify a maximum credible accident o r  
perhaps two credible accidents which, by virtue of their consequences and prob- 
abilities, a r e  worthy of further study. 
7. Consequences of On-Lab Accidents 
a. Personnel Exposures. F o r  each of the credible release accidents 
identified in the previous section, analyses will be made to determine the 
numbers  of people exposed to given exposure levels  and the associated ex- 
posure probabilities. Both on-lab personnel and surrounding populatioils 
should be considered. Appropriate dispersion mechanisms wrll be rr:odeled 
to  t ransport  the activity from the point of r e l ease  to  the location of interaction 
with personnel. It is most  probable that only inhalation exposures need be 
considered. Variods multiples of the maximum permissible  lung burdevl for  
Pu-238 can be selected a s  the reference exposure levels. While the basic data 
and models  can be borrowed f rom the AEC's  SAR, some independent analysis 
must  be performed by J P L  in connection with on-lab personnel exposures 
because the envir onrn ent and surroundings a r e  unique. 
b. Proper ty  Exposure.  In addition to  personnel exposures,  each 
of the credible r e l ease  accidents will resul t  in radioactive contamination to 
the immediate facility, and possibly t o  the land a r e a  downwind of the facility, 
Th i s  section will present  the consequences of activity r e l ease  with. respect  t o  
property exposure. Contamination a r e a s ,  magnitudes, and probabilities will 
be determined. As in the case  of personnel  exposures,  only some of the r e -  
quired data can be borrowed from the AEC's  SAR. Some independent JPL 
analytical effort will be required. 
8. On-Lab R e s ~ o n s i b i l i t  i e s  
a. Responsibility Assignments. Th i s  section identifies the functional 
group and the specific individual(s) having responsibility f o r  each aspectof  
on-lab activity. Th i s  includes the pe r sons  with authority to  modify approved 
plans and procedures and those to be contacted in the event of non-nominal 
RTG behavior. 
b. Emergency Plans.  Detailed plans and procedures will be presented 
fo r  radiological emergencies ,  r e a l  o r  potential. This  will include evacuation 
plans for  r e l e a s e s  o r  suspected re l eases ,  activity immobilization procedures,  
source  recovery plans and procedures,  etc. It will a l so  include procedures 
and precautions in the event of non-radiological accidents such a s  earthquakes, 
explosions o r  f i res .  Personnel  having cognizance and responsibility in en; e r  - 
gencies will be identified along with the i r  roles .  AEC and other  agency author- 
i t ies  who must  be contacted in emergencies  will a l so  be named. The Emergency 
Procedures  Manual discussed in Section VII can be referenced and used to 
p repa re  this  section of the SAR. 
c. Personnel  Qualifications. Qualifications will be presented fo r  all 
those personnel who have normal  o r  emergency health physics and radiological 
safety responsibili t ies.  The qualifications will include pertinent training and 
experience. 
9. Launch Site Operations Analysis 
a. Description of Operations. The scope of this  section is similar. 
to  that of the corresponding section for  the on-lab operations. A complete 
description of al l  events a d  operations will be provided covering the t ime 
from a r r i v a l  of the RTGs at the launch si te  until liftoff. 
b. Accident Networks. Detailed accident networks will be developed 
for  the launch si te  operations. These  will be s imi la r  in scope and purpose to 
the networks described in the on-lab operations analysis. 
c. Fa i lu reModeAna lys i s .  T h i s w i l l b e s i m i l a r i n n a t u r e t o t h e  
failure mode analysis  fo r  the on-lab operations. 
d. Source T e r m  Definition. Th i s  requi res  a paral lel  effort to that 
for  the on-lab analysis. 
e. Launch Site Activity Release Summary. Th i s  is a brief summari -  
zation of the r e su l t s  of the launch s i t e  operations analysis.  It has  the same 
scope and intent a s  does the corresponding section for  the on-lab case.  As 
appropriate,  the summary will identify one o r  two maximum credible accidents 
which will be evaluated further .  
10. Consequences of Launch Site Accidents 
a. Personnel  Exposures.  Personnel  exposures will be determined 
in the same  manner  and format  as those for  the  on-lab re leases .  However, 
the extent of J P L  effort will be somewhat l e s s  because a g rea te r  portion of 
applicable analysis  r e su l t s  can be borrowed directly from the AEC1s SAR, 
b. P roper ty  Exposure. Th i s  section will present  data correspond- 
ing to that developed fo r  the on-lab operations. Here too, the reqaired JPL 
effort will be l e s s  than fo r  the on-lab case  because much of the AEC's SXAR 
resu l t s  will be applicable. 
11. Launch Site Responsibilities 
a. Responsibility Assignments. Th i s  section identifies the functional 
group and the specific i n d i v i d u a l m h  responsibility for  each aspect of the 
launch s i te  activity. Unlike the on-lab activities,  the launch si te  responsi- 
bil i t ies may  be shared  by Air  Force ,  NASA, J P L ,  and contractor personnel, 
b. Emergency Plans.  Detailed plans and procedures will be presented 
fo r  radiological emergencies  a s  in the corresponding on-lab section, 
c. Personnel  Qualifications. Qualifications will be presented for all 
those personnel  who have normal  o r  emergency health physics and radiological 
safety responsibili t ies.  
12.  References 
Th i s  section will l is t  all  documents referenced in the U s e r ' s  Safety 
Analysis Report in addition to a bibliography of pertinent documents, a s  
required. 
13. Appendices 
Any analysis details and data compilations which a re  too extensive to  
incorporate into the body of the repor t  will be appended t o  the report. 
C. Schedule 


































1X. NEW TECHNOLOGY 
No reportable i t ems  of "New Technology" have been identified in  the 
performance of the work described in th is  report .  
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